Why India Keeps Buying Russian Oil — And Why the US Keeps Letting It
India Russia oil 2026 have produced one of the most revealing diplomatic stories of the year. For months, Washington pressured India to stop buying Russian crude. It imposed 50% tariffs. It sanctioned major Russian oil firms. It made the purchase of Russian oil a central demand in bilateral trade negotiations. And India — slowly, reluctantly — reduced its Russian oil imports.
Then the Iran war closed the Strait of Hormuz. And within days, the same US government that had spent a year trying to cut India off from Russian oil quietly handed New Delhi a waiver to buy as much of it as possible.
India snapped up 30 million barrels of Russian crude in under a week. Indian state refiner IOC and private giant Reliance each bought around 10 million barrels. Russian oil exports to India have already rebounded to 1.8 million barrels per day — the highest level since June 2025 — and are projected to hit 2.2 million by April.
This episode tells you everything you need to know about India-Russia oil relations, India’s energy strategy, and the limits of American pressure on Indian foreign policy. Here is the full story.
Why India Started Buying Russian Oil in the First Place
Before February 2022, Russia supplied only about 1-2% of India’s crude oil imports. India bought mostly from the Middle East — Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE. Russia was a minor supplier.
When Russia invaded Ukraine and the West imposed sweeping sanctions, something unexpected happened for India. Russian oil suddenly became available at discounts of 10 to 20 dollars per barrel below the international Brent benchmark. For the world’s third-largest crude importer — a country that spends roughly 85 billion dollars a year on oil imports — that discount was transformative.
India’s refineries, which maintain flexible crude blending capabilities enabling rapid transitions between grades, moved quickly. By mid-2022 Indian refiners were buying Russian crude at scale. By June 2025, Russia’s share of India’s oil imports had reached approximately 50% — or 1.6 million barrels per day. India had gone from buying almost no Russian oil to making Russia its single largest crude supplier in roughly three years.
The Council on Foreign Relations noted the structural reality clearly: India imports nearly 87% of its crude oil, making energy security the supreme priority of any Indian government. When discounted Russian oil was available and the West’s sanctions did not legally prohibit Indian purchases, India bought it. That was not a political statement. It was economics.
How the US Tried to Stop It — And What It Cost India
Washington’s discomfort with India’s Russian oil purchases grew steadily from 2022 onwards. The concern was straightforward — India was helping fund the Russian war machine, keeping Moscow’s economy afloat despite Western sanctions, and undermining the West’s pressure campaign against Putin.
Trump’s approach was characteristically blunt. In August 2025, the administration imposed a 25% punitive tariff specifically on India for buying Russian crude, on top of the existing 25% reciprocal tariff — taking the total tariff burden on Indian exports to 50%. This was direct economic punishment for an energy policy decision.
The pressure worked, partially. India reduced Russian crude imports from a peak of around 1.6 million barrels per day to approximately 1.1 million barrels per day by January 2026 — a 32% reduction. Russia’s share of India’s oil supply fell from around 50% to about 21%. India shifted purchases to Middle Eastern suppliers, primarily Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
Then the February 2026 trade deal arrived. Trump claimed India had committed to stop buying Russian oil entirely. India never confirmed this. The MEA’s position, stated consistently, was that all energy decisions are guided by availability, costs, risks and national interest — not by external pressure. But the direction of travel was clear. India was moving away from Russian oil, however reluctantly.
The Iran War Reversal — How Everything Changed
On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel struck Iran. Within days, the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed. India’s Middle Eastern oil supplies — the very supplies it had been buying to replace Russian crude under US pressure — were suddenly inaccessible.
The irony was total. Washington had spent a year pushing India away from Russian oil and toward Middle Eastern oil. Then Washington’s own military action made Middle Eastern oil unavailable. India was left with a choice between running short of crude or returning to Russia.
On March 5, the US Treasury Department resolved the contradiction by granting India a 30-day waiver to buy Russian crude currently stranded at sea. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described it as a measure to keep oil flowing in global markets. The waiver covered Russian crude loaded onto vessels before March 5 and destined for Indian ports.
India did not wait for a second invitation. As Bloomberg reported, Indian companies bought up all Russian crude available on the spot market in less than a week. IOC and Reliance each bought around 10 million barrels. The total purchases reached approximately 30 million barrels — roughly equivalent to India’s entire monthly Russian crude intake before the pressure campaign began.
India’s government made its position explicit. On March 7, it issued a statement that is worth quoting in full: India has never depended on permission from any country to buy Russian oil. India is still importing Russian oil even in February 2026, and Russia is still India’s largest crude oil supplier.
India Russia Oil: The Numbers in 2026
| Period | Russian Oil Share | What Drove the Change |
| June 2025 (peak) | ~50% of imports (1.6 million bpd) | Cheap discounted crude, no major pressure |
| January 2026 | ~21% of imports (1.1 million bpd) | US tariff pressure, trade deal negotiations |
| February 2026 | Lowest in years | Trade deal finalised, US pressure maximum |
| March 2026 (post-waiver) | ~36% of imports (1.8 million bpd) | Hormuz closed, waiver granted, India snapped up supply |
| Projected April 2026 | Up to 40-44% (2.0-2.2 million bpd) | Waiver extended or informal pass given |
The pattern in the table tells a clear story. India’s Russian oil purchases are highly sensitive to US pressure — they fell sharply when tariffs were imposed and the trade deal was being negotiated. But they bounce back equally sharply when the pressure eases or when energy security demands it. The underlying commercial relationship remains strong regardless of political headwinds.
The Full Timeline
| Date | What Happened |
| 2022 onwards | India ramps up Russian oil purchases after Ukraine invasion — gets 30-40% discount on Brent |
| August 2025 | Trump adds 25% punitive tariff on India for buying Russian crude — total tariff 50% |
| Late 2025 | India reduces Russian oil to 1.1 million bpd — Russia’s share falls to 21% |
| February 6, 2026 | India-US trade deal framework — Trump claims India committed to stop Russian oil |
| February 28, 2026 | US-Israel strike Iran. Strait of Hormuz closes. Middle East supply cut off. |
| March 5, 2026 | US Treasury grants 30-day waiver allowing India to buy Russian oil at sea |
| March 7, 2026 | India says: ‘We have never depended on permission from any country to buy Russian oil’ |
| March 10, 2026 | Indian firms snap up 30 million barrels of Russian crude in under a week |
| March 2026 | Russian exports to India rebound to 1.8 million bpd — highest since June 2025 |
| April 4, 2026 | 30-day waiver expires — India must decide again |
Beyond Oil: The Broader India Russia Relationship
India Russia relations in 2026 extend well beyond crude oil. Defence cooperation remains the other major pillar.
Russia still supplies approximately 35% of India’s defence equipment — fighter jets, submarines, air defence systems, and artillery. The S-400 air defence system India purchased from Russia remains one of its most capable long-range air defence assets. Replacing this equipment with Western alternatives would take decades and cost hundreds of billions of dollars. India cannot simply walk away from the defence relationship even if it wanted to.
The INDRA military exercise series — suspended from 2022 to 2024 — resumed in 2025. The Indian and Russian navies held joint maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal in March-April 2025. The Indian Air Force hosted the AviaIndra exercise in December 2025. South Asian Voices noted that this gradual resumption of military-to-military engagement signals a positive trajectory for the bilateral relationship.
India and Russia also signed a Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics agreement in February 2025 — allowing both militaries to use each other’s facilities for resupply and maintenance. This is a significant deepening of operational military cooperation that goes beyond arms purchases.
On trade, India’s exports to Russia have grown significantly since 2022. India has become a major supplier of electronics, machinery, and pharmaceuticals to Russia — partly filling the gap left by Western sanctions. This trade creates economic interests on both sides that make the relationship durable regardless of diplomatic pressures.
The Democratic Democrats Problem
The March 2026 Russian oil waiver created a domestic political problem for the Trump administration that illustrates the contradictions in US policy toward India.
Congressional Democrats — Representatives and Senators who had supported the sanctions regime and the pressure campaign on Russia — were furious. Representative Sam Liccardo and Senator Ruben Gallego wrote to Treasury Secretary Bessent calling the waiver dangerous, self-defeating, and indefensible — and describing it as an inexplicable act of material benefit to the enemy.
Their anger exposed the absurdity of the situation. Washington had spent a year pressuring India to stop buying Russian oil. It had imposed 50% tariffs to punish India for doing so. It had made Russian oil purchases a central demand in trade negotiations. And then, when its own military action created an energy crisis, it issued a waiver telling India to go ahead and buy Russian oil after all.
This is not India’s contradiction. It is America’s. And India watched it unfold with quiet satisfaction.
ThirdPol’s Take
The India-Russia oil story of 2026 is ultimately a story about the limits of economic coercion as a foreign policy tool.
Washington spent a year trying to reshape India’s energy choices through tariffs and trade pressure. It achieved a partial success — India did reduce Russian oil purchases significantly in late 2025 and early 2026. But the moment geopolitical circumstances changed, India returned to Russian oil immediately and unapologetically.
This is not because India is pro-Russia. India is not pro-Russia. Modi has told Putin repeatedly and publicly that this is not an era of war. India has consistently called for dialogue and a negotiated settlement in Ukraine. India’s continued purchase of Russian oil is not an endorsement of Russian policy. It is an energy security decision made in the interests of 1.4 billion Indians.
The deeper lesson is that energy security cannot be outsourced to political agreements. India’s energy choices are driven by availability, cost, and reliability of supply — not by what Washington or Brussels wants. When Russian oil is cheap, available and bypasses Hormuz, India will buy it. When Middle Eastern oil is cheaper and more accessible, India will buy that. India imports crude from 40 countries for exactly this reason.
The Iran war has actually strengthened India’s case for keeping Russia as a major oil supplier. Russian crude bypasses the Strait of Hormuz entirely. In a world where the Gulf can be closed at any moment by a US military decision, having a major supplier whose supply route does not go through the Gulf is not just economical. It is strategically essential.
India has never needed permission to buy Russian oil. The 2026 episode proved it does not intend to ask for it either.
Amit Mangal writes on India’s foreign policy and geopolitics at ThirdPol. Follow ThirdPol on X and LinkedIn.