India’s Taliban Policy: Engagement, Risks and Strategy
This piece offers an independent, fact-based view of India’s choices in Afghanistan.
India’s Real Choices in Afghanistan
The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 reshaped South Asia’s strategic landscape. India’s Taliban policy now sits at the centre of this changing environment, as New Delhi navigates a complex mix of security concerns and regional competition. It revived old anxieties, reopened long-standing regional rivalries and forced neighbouring states to rethink their foreign policy. For India, which spent two decades supporting the former Afghan Republic and maintaining distance from the Taliban, the new reality requires a cautious approach. The challenge is to protect national interests without offering legitimacy to a regime that remains unpredictable and internally fragile.
Related analysis: Read how regional power shifts are affecting India’s neighbourhood in our study of the India–China Himalayan rivalry
India’s Core Interests in Afghanistan
India’s Afghanistan policy is shaped by three long-standing priorities. The first is the protection of India’s extensive development investments. Between 2001 and 2021, India built major roads, power projects, schools, hospitals and the Afghan Parliament. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, India spent more than USD 3 billion during this period, making it one of Afghanistan’s largest regional partners. This goodwill is a strategic asset.
The second concern is security. India cannot afford a repeat of the 1990s, when Afghan soil became a safe haven for anti-India militant groups. The Taliban claim they have severed ties with such networks but United Nations Security Council monitoring teams continue to document the presence of al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed elements inside Afghanistan.
The third concern is Pakistan. For decades, Islamabad has used Afghanistan as strategic depth. India’s policy aims to prevent Kabul from becoming an extension of Pakistan’s security establishment. The current tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban open a small but important diplomatic space that India is exploring with caution. Scholars such as Avinash Paliwal have noted that the Taliban today operate with more autonomy than Pakistan expected, although this autonomy remains limited and unpredictable.
Why Recognition Is Risky
India’s Taliban policy is centred around increasing contact with Taliban officials and reopening its diplomatic presence in Kabul. However, recognition is a much larger step that carries serious risks. Recognition could improve short-term cooperation, but it would also legitimise a regime that remains exclusionary and deeply repressive.
The economic picture is equally troubling. Afghanistan’s GDP has contracted sharply since 2021. UN agencies estimate that nearly half the population now requires humanitarian assistance. A regime this fragile cannot be India’s long-term partner.
Granting recognition now could reduce India’s leverage and make New Delhi complicit in the Taliban’s failures.
Security Risks Remain High
The Taliban claim to have severed ties with transnational jihadist groups. Independent assessments do not support this claim.
The United Nations Security Council Monitoring Report, continued links between al-Qaeda and senior Taliban figures. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan remains active along the border. Elements of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed continue to operate within Afghanistan’s informal networks.
At the moment, the Taliban are suppressing overt militant activity to maintain international relevance. But their capacity and intent can shift quickly. A weakened Taliban regime could easily lose control, turning Afghanistan into a launchpad for extremist groups once again. India cannot ignore this possibility.
What India Should Do Next
India’s Taliban policy follows a middle path. It neither isolates the Taliban completely nor embraces them. Instead, it prefers conditional engagement. This means maintaining diplomatic channels, supporting Afghan civilians through humanitarian aid, and coordinating with other regional powers on counter-terrorism.
India also understands that Afghanistan’s long-term stability requires more than religious authority. It needs economic recovery, political inclusion and regional connectivity. Without these, the country will remain trapped in cycles of crisis.
A Larger Geopolitical Context
The Afghan question is not only about South Asia. It now intersects with great-power politics. China is expanding its influence through infrastructure and mining deals. Russia remains involved through regional formats. Iran seeks to protect its ethnic and sectarian interests. The United States maintains a limited counter-terror presence but no long-term plan.
India cannot ignore this shifting map. Cautious engagement gives it a seat at the table. Recognition would give away leverage without solving any of the deeper problems.
Conclusion
India’s Taliban approach is simple. Engage, but do not endorse. Communicate, but do not legitimise. Influence the Taliban where possible, but maintain strategic distance. This balance protects India’s security interests, supports the Afghan people and keeps New Delhi’s options open in a region defined by instability and shifting power.
If restraint is paired with clear-eyed strategy, India can safeguard its interests without giving unconditional approval to a regime that has yet to prove it can offer stability or responsible governance.
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The Analysis Desk at ThirdPol writes on India, its foreign policy, security issues and events shaping the region